It is extremely questionable whether inductivism (i.e. proof by empirical evidence) is a valid method of proof
Given this methodological weakness, all of your previous expositions are no more than theories, with some, albeit frequently disputed, empirical evidence. That is why all scientific laws and popular theories never lose their 'theory' tag.
If you don't mind my saying so, it appears you have a view of science that seems to have become stuck in the 18th century.
The key problem with inductivism which as your rightly point out proceeds from general statements to proof with empirical evidence, is that in order to maintain a hypothesis would require an infinite number of observations. It is what philosophers call quantifying over unlimited domains. For example, I studied philosophy at the University of Hull. It is a little known fact abut the city of Hull is that it (used to have) a privately owned telephone firm, not BT. One of the most obvious features of Hull for this reason, was that all the telephone boxes were white.
http://www.lazyllama.com/photos/albums/ ... yphone.jpg
Now, take your average Hullian, schooled in Inductive thinking, who says thus: "all telephone boxes are white", and to prove it he goes street to street, and in every street he finds a white telephone box. Case closed you might think. Of course had our inductivist proceeded beyond the border of Humberside he would have found phone boxes that weren't white and then his theory would be in trouble. And that is problem of inductivist logic: it asserts (in the case of hypothesising about the asthetics of street furniture) that ALL telephone boxes EVERYWHERE are white, when of course they are not, in short in qualifies over unlimited domains.
You can perform as many experiments as you like to prove a theory (in this case making observations in accordance with the theory) but there theory is never proven. This is severely limiting on the importance of individual observations and presumes the uniformity of nature which I note you make mention of in your list of 'science problems (number 7, which is like assuming the uniformity of telephone boxes.
Falsification
No modern scientist thinks this way. The empirical collection of data as the principal way of ascertaining what is true is still the going concern but it all changed (particularly in the West after World War II) When Karl Popper published his English version of The Logic of Scientific Discovery (it was first published in Germany in 1934) he establishs falsification as a preferred method of scientific enquiry.
Falsification even has a formal expression in logic and probability
P implies Q.
Q is false
Therefore it can be logically concluded that P must be false.
Popper's insight was that the observation of a single non-white telephone box will falsify the statement. He argued that methodological falsificiationism should be adopted by science, and this is important because theories are made up of many such statements. In effect what he was arguing for is that scientific theories refine themselves by becoming less wrong. It would be possible for instance for our inductivist hull-born telephone scientist to correspond with some one in Cornwall who insist that phone boxes in Cornwall are blue (I've no idea if they are or not I'm just trying to illustrate an example) Hull-man might then recompose his statement: 'all telephone boxes are white, except those in Cornwall' or 'All telephone boxes are white and Cornish telephone box scientists are incompetent.' such ad hoc hypothesis adjustments is not what methodological falsification is about.
That classic example of methodological falsification in action and to refer to my previous post is Newton and Einsetin.
Newton's law (the force of gravity between two masses is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them) and the attending laws of motion and a lot of maths can do a pretty good job of describing gravity and the motions of the planets, or at least most of them. The precession of the orbit of Mercury was not predicted by Newton's mechanics. It's a flaw, it's a problem it's falsifies Newton's mechanics - but here's the the thing: NOT ABSOLUTELY it just means something is unaccounted for. Einstein's general relativity can account for the orbit of the planet Mercury, it succeeds where Newton ideas fail. This doesn't discredit Newton, Newtonian mechanics work just fine for most things up to and including launching space shuttles but it is an imperfect theory. Including general relativity (gravity understood as the warping of the geometry of space-time) extends our knowledge of not only how gravity works (the inverse square law is still true) but also explains that gravity corresponds to changes in the properties of space and time, which in turn changes the straightest-possible paths that objects will naturally follow, which can be summed up as spacetime tells matter how to move; matter tells spacetime how to curve.
And this is what puts the lie to your assertion about methodological weakness and 'no more than theories'
I've tried to demonstrate that what you have argued is the scientific method, does not correspond to science as practiced in the 21st century. Hence you have produced a flawed analysis based on a redundant approach. This is not why scientific laws 'never loose their theory tag', as you put it. A scientific theory is a broad desription of a collection of specific hypotheses, past empirical observations, and predictions of unobserved phenomena which can be tested and falsified . This means all theories are (pay attention) tentative and subject to correction or inclusion in a wider theory
The methodological weakness of induction has been corrected by methodological falsification which is what is used to construct tests and models and predictions. When these tests do not falsify confidence in the correctness of a theory increases but it can always potentially be falsified and never 'proven'. Hence most scientific theories you will find discuss what is 'probably' the case - for this reason.
If you think my explanations of grenade detonations and how photons create colour are theories - great we're on the same wavelength, finally!
If, however, you think that being theoretical is somehow a position of weakness, in which we cannot place our confidence becasue you missunderstand what 'a theory of something' , I advise you never to fly in a plane just in case Newton's third law of motion suddenly decides to stop working.
A a brief word about that. Newton's laws are 'just theories', that is to say observations with confirmations which indicated order and patterns got called 'laws' back in the day. If Darwin had been writing a hundred years earlier we'd be taking about the Law of Evolution, and if Newton had been writing two hundred years later it would be the Theory of Gravity.
Parsimony
Not one of the sirens from Greek mythology*, this is a principle of applying, what is known as Occam's Razor from the 14th century William of Ockham. Occam's razor has two formulations in Latin:
entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem
Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity.
and
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate
Plurality should not be posited without necessity
Taken together, it can be said that parsimony is the principle of selecting the theory to explain observations that introduces the fewest assumptions and postulates the fewest entities to explain the observed result.
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Two principles of modern science
The requirement to put to the test hypotheses and attempt to falsify them is today the standard methodological approach of confirming or rejecting hypotheses and is about as far removed from the picture of simple induction (which I acknowledge is flawed) you present as possible. The Parsimonious principle is the one that says the best explanation is usually the simplest. although it is more what you'd call "guidelines" than actual rules - to quote Pirates of the Caribbean - so the explanations may be quite complex but tend to not have multiple entities beyond necessity. i.e sufficinent explanations. An assumption of a god acting behind a natural process (which may itself consist of several complex and interacting components as in the Poseidon and weather pattern example) is to multiply unecassarily the number of entities involved. You don't need a god to explain the phenomenon. And so it is with all things.
The example as it relates to evolution would go something like this:
The evolution of the great apes and humans from a common ancestor predicts a (geologically) recent common ancestor of apes and humans. Molecular biology identifies DNA as the mechanism for inherited traits. Therefore if common descent is true, human DNA should be more similar to great apes than other mammals. If this is not the case, then common descent is falsified. DNA analysis has shown that humans and the great apes share a large percentage of their DNA, and hence human evolution has passed a falsifiable test. Assuming the a god or controlling force has manipulated this process is to introduced unnecessary plurality (more entities than are required) to sufficiently explain the phenomenon.
*That would be Parthenope.